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IS THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION PROJECT BEING ENDED? 
MICHAEL J. ZIMMER 
 
With the election of an African-American President, there was, not surprisingly, 
discussion that the United States had finally gotten past our history of racial discrimination 
and had entered a so-called post-racial era.1 There has been, of course, progress. Despite 
strained arguments that Brown v. Board of Education2 has had little progressive effect,3 the 
end of de jure segregation has had significant impact in the public life of a major part of this 
country. Ending the “whites only” signs in public places has had a tremendous liberating 
effect for all Americans—black, white, or other. While our general social norms now find 
the explicit use of racist statements and actions to be unacceptable,4 discrimination is still a 
significant feature of how our society operates. Social science is increasingly discovering 
the extent to which racial bias continues to exist, implicitly if not explicitly,5 and has 
                                                 
 Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. This paper was presented at the inaugural 
symposium of the Indiana Journal of Law & Social Equality on March 30, 2012. My thanks to the journal 
members and to Professor Julia Lamber for inviting me to participate. Also, thanks to Laura Hoffman, JSD 
2012, and Kelly Chu, USC JD 2014 (expected), for their research help and, as always, Margaret L. Moses. 
1 André Douglas Pond Cummings, Post Racialism?, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 601, 606 (2011); Michael 
Lwin, The Numbers Game: Covering Asian Americans and Post-Racial America, 15 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 92, 
93 (2010). 
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
3 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1993). 
4 For background, see Jerry Kang, Mark Bennett, Devon Carbado, Pam Casey, Nilanjana Dasgupta, David 
Faigman, Rachel Godsil, Anthony G. Greenwald, Justin Levinson & Jennifer Mnookin, Implicit Bias in the 
Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012). See also IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS AND THE LAW (Justin D. Levinson 
& Robert J. Smith eds., 2012). 
5 See IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS AND THE LAW, supra note 4. 
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demonstrated how that bias influences behavior.6 While the understanding of discrimination 
has deepened, the legal tools to address it have, at a minimum, not kept up with the science 
and have actually been significantly narrowed. What has happened is that the Supreme 
Court has not acted to achieve the color-blind society Justice Harlan articulated as the 
purpose of equal protection in his dissent to Plessy v. Ferguson.7 Instead, it has all but 
ended the antidiscrimination project that began with the ratification of the Civil War 
Amendments, Brown’s ending of de jure segregation,8 and the enactment of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964,9 as well as the Voting Rights Act of 1965.10 
The thesis of this Article is that the national project to redress discrimination, which 
has waxed and waned through the decades since the enactment of the Civil War 
Amendments, is now being squeezed toward oblivion by important substantive and 
procedural decisions of the Roberts Supreme Court. While the procedural restrictions are 
based on new interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the substantive 
restrictions, ironically, are primarily driven by a narrow vision of the purpose of the 
                                                 
6 See Kang et. al., supra note 4. 
7 163 U.S. 537, 559–60 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
8 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955), with its “all deliberate speed” limit on school 
desegregation was only the beginning.  The 1974 decision in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), 
defined the scope of de jure discrimination so as not to reach beyond individual school districts, and meant 
that white flight to the suburbs would reopen the schools to segregation. The school desegregation project was 
ended with the Rehnquist Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
9 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 
and 42 U.S.C.). 
10 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973 1973bb–
1).  
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Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.11 Now equal protection law has been turned upside 
down with more protection provided to the majority against governmental action aimed at 
redressing the present consequences of historic discrimination, while members of groups 
that have been its victims face increasingly difficult barriers to their attempts to redress the 
present discrimination they face.12 
Part I will describe the procedural barriers the Roberts Supreme Court has erected to 
prevent discrimination claims from being decided on the merits in court. These barriers 
divert claims from court to arbitration, even if there is no actual consent to arbitrate by the 
claimant. Arbitration cuts off the right to a jury trial and may prevent bringing a class 
action. If arbitration is avoided, the Court has imposed a “plausibility” standard at the 
pleading stage of litigation which allows lawsuits to be dismissed before discovery takes 
place. Furthermore, the Court has limited the possibility of bringing class actions. Part II 
will show how the substantive law applied to discrimination claims has been narrowed for 
claims typically brought by women and people of color, while broadening claims brought 
by the white majority. Part III will look to the immediate future of the antidiscrimination 
project in the Supreme Court affirmative action case, Fisher v. University of Texas.13 Part 
IV will conclude. 
                                                 
11 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
12 See Ian F. Haney López, Is the “Post” in Post-Racial the “Blind” in Colorblind?, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 
807 (2011). 
13 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (Feb. 21, 2012). 
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I. THE PROCEDURAL RESTRICTIONS THAT SHRINK THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION PROJECT 
IN EMPLOYMENT14 
 
The Supreme Court has promulgated new procedural laws that, as a practical matter, 
severely limit the ability of employees to challenge the employment discrimination they 
suffer. First, the Court has created a new arbitration law that diverts workers’ claims of 
discrimination from the courts to arbitration without their actual consent. Second, for any 
case that escapes arbitration, the Court has heightened pleading standards to now allow for 
the dismissal of cases before discovery by motion to dismiss rather than by summary 
judgment after discovery is complete. Third, the Court has substantially narrowed the 
availability of class actions in discrimination cases. Looking at any single case or area 
alone, it may be easy to escape the judgment that the Court has ended the antidiscrimination 
project, but together, the antidiscrimination project has become so squeezed that soon it 
will, for all practical purposes, be brought to an end. 
First, as to arbitration, the Supreme Court has taken major steps to “privatize” the 
resolution of employment disputes without the real consent of the claimants.15 Employers 
can now force their workers to sign these agreements as a condition of getting or keeping 
their jobs. Such “agreements” are enforceable even if the employee is at-will and the 
arbitration agreement stands as the sole written term of the contract. The story begins back 
                                                 
14 This paper will principally focus on issues of employment, but these procedural restrictions apply more 
broadly including, for example, consumer claims.  
15 See Margaret L. Moses, Privatized “Justice,” 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 535 (2005), for background on the 
development of the legal enforcement of adhesion contracts requiring workers and consumers to take their 
claims to arbitration rather than to court. 
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in 1974, when, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,16 the Court held that, consistent with 
the prior law of arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act,17 “[a]rbitral procedures, 
while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively 
inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created by Title VII,”18 because the 
“resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a primary responsibility of courts.”19 The 
turn toward privatizing disputes through the use of arbitration began in 1983. The Court 
created, in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,20 a very 
strong presumption of arbitrability.21 By 1985, the Court had expanded the scope of 
arbitrable issues beyond contract claims to include statutory claims such as antitrust 
claims.22 In 1991, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Court applied the 
presumption to an employment case wherein registration, including an arbitration clause, 
was required by the New York Stock Exchange to work in the securities industry.23 
According to the Court, statutory claims, such as claims of age discrimination under the 
                                                 
16 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
17 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). 
18 Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56. 
19 Id. at 57.  
20 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
21 “[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Id. at 
24–25. 
22 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 615 (1985) (enforcing 
arbitration clause providing for arbitration in Japan for Puerto Rican car dealership and requiring arbitration in 
Japan of U.S. antitrust claims raised by car dealership). 
23 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991). Cf. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (holding state laws to 
the contrary are preempted by federal law). 
Is the Antidiscrimination Project Being Ended? 
2013 
6 
 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act24 that were included in an arbitration agreement, 
were enforceable pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act.25 In 2001 in Circuit City Stores, 
Inc. v. Adams,26 the Court construed Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act that provided 
it shall not apply “to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other 
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”27 Rather than construing this 
broad exclusion consistent with its actual terms and with the intent of Congress, the Court 
turned this general exclusion of most workers on its head to become a rule that includes 
most workers with the exclusion limited to minor exceptions.28 Furthermore, in 14 Penn 
Plaza v. Pyett,29 the Court held that union and management could, in a collective bargaining 
agreement, require individuals to arbitrate their statutory antidiscrimination claims, which 
were again age discrimination claims, even though the workers had never agreed to do so.30 
Finally, in AT&T Mobility v. Concepción, the Supreme Court upheld an arbitration clause 
                                                 
24 29 U.S.C. § 621 
25 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. 
26 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
27 9 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added). For more background on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Federal 
Arbitration Act see Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal 
Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99 (2006). 
28 Adams, 532 U.S. at 114–15, 119. See also Moses, supra note 27, at 146. 
29 556 U.S. 247 (2009). See also Margaret L. Moses, The Pretext of Textualism: Disregarding Stare Decisis 
in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 825 (2010). 
30 14 Penn Plaza, 556 U.S. at 274. Since the Steelworkers Trilogy cases that were decided in 1960, pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate contained in collective bargaining agreements have been enforceable because it 
is assumed that the union and the employer each possess sufficient bargaining power so that the agreement to 
arbitrate is actually consensual. See Katherine V.W. Stone, The Steelworkers Trilogy and the Evolution of 
Labor Arbitration, LABOR LAW STORIES (Laura Cooper & Catherine Fisk eds., 2005). 
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that cuts off a consumer’s right to bring a class action.31 Two bills have been introduced in 
Congress to overturn some or all of the law of arbitration as promulgated by a majority of 
the Court, but it appears both bills died after being referred to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.32 
Arbitration can be a useful and efficient way to resolve disputes if, in fact, the 
agreement is consensual. In the employment context, as in many other kinds of situations, 
post-dispute arbitration gives the parties to the dispute the option of customizing the way 
their dispute will be resolved. In commercial situations, pre-dispute arbitration can also be 
valuable because the parties are usually more-or-less equal in bargaining power.33 Pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate employment disputes, especially if that is the sole term of 
the contract, are almost always contracts of adhesion. If an applicant wants to get or keep a 
job and the employer demands that she sign an arbitration agreement, then this creates a 
take-it-or-leave-it situation because of the unequal bargaining power between the parties. It 
is counterfactual to describe these agreements as consensual. Thus, the arbitration law the 
Supreme Court has created undermines the notion that arbitration is justified because both 
parties have voluntarily agreed to it.34 The last fig leaf that consent is the basis of arbitration 
                                                 
31 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (holding that California law prohibiting arbitration provisions waiving class 
actions is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act). 
32 See Arbitration Fairness Act, S 987, 112th Cong. (2011), the related Arbitration Fairness Act, H.R. 1873, 
112th Cong. (2011), and Fair Arbitration Act, S 1186, 112th Cong. (2011). 
33 See generally MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION (2d ed. 2012). 
34 See Moses, supra note 15, at 537. 
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has been shredded if a union can waive a worker’s individual right to take statutory claims 
to court.35 
An employee whose statutory claim is diverted to arbitration loses her right to her 
day in court, as well as the right to a jury trial provided by antidiscrimination statutes and 
the Constitution. While class actions can be brought to enforce employment discrimination 
statutes,36 such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,37 arbitration provisions 
redirecting all statutory claims of employees to arbitration cut off all statutory class actions, 
just as the consumer class action claims were cut off in Concepción.38 The Supreme Court 
claims the arbitration law it has created out of whole cloth is not inconsistent with the 
provisions of these antidiscrimination statutes that provide access to courts because the 
rights to go to court, to get a jury trial, and to bring class actions are only procedural and not 
substantive. This is a distinction without a difference because procedural rights are integral 
to the substantive rights these procedures are supposed to serve. The right to a jury trial may 
be procedural, but it is a long cherished right that has been shown to be more accurate than 
                                                 
35 By supporting or joining a union, employees are not in any way consenting to send their statutory claims to 
arbitration rather than allowing them to go to court. Employees represented by unions with collective 
bargaining agreements may not even support the union that represents them. They have not consented to the 
union in any sense, including the union’s waiver of their right to take statutory claims to court. See Moses, 
supra note 29, at 827. See generally, Ann C. Hodges, Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the Unionized 
Workplace: Is Bargaining with the Union Required?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 513 (2001). 
36 E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
37 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006). 
38 See Concepción, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. Since workers are consumers, this decision cuts off their claims that 
would only be economically viable if aggregated with the claims of other consumers with similar claims. 
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other forms of dispute resolution.39 Denying the right to bring a class action means that 
some good claims will never be brought because of their small economic value. Those 
workers will be completely denied any real chance to have their substantive rights 
vindicated. 
Those employees with federal statutory claims, who somehow escape arbitration and 
who can file actions in federal court, are now faced with new and difficult procedural 
barriers that the Supreme Court has erected that substantially reduce their chances to take 
those cases to trial. Under the longstanding “notice pleading” rules of Rule 8(a)(2) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that a complaint need only contain a “short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”40 Rule 12(b)(6) 
motions to dismiss based on the complaint alone were rare because the defendant typically 
had been given sufficient notice of what the claim was about.41 Typically if cases were 
dismissed, it would be after an answer was filed or a motion to dismiss had been denied, 
which would be by a Rule 56 Summary Judgment Motion42 after discovery was complete.43 
                                                 
39 See Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court’s Evolving Seventh Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183 (2000). 
40 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
41 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). For an example of how simple factual pleading sufficed see Swierkiewicz v. 
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002). A unanimous Supreme Court held that the notice pleading standard of 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) was met by allegations that plaintiff had been terminated on account of his national origin 
in violation of Title VII and on account of his age in violation of the ADEA. His complaint detailed the events 
leading to his termination, provided relevant dates, and included the ages and nationalities of at least some of 
the relevant persons involved with his termination. Few complaints, therefore, were subject to motions to 
dismiss. 
42 FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
Is the Antidiscrimination Project Being Ended? 
2013 
10 
 
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,44 however, the Court moved the real possibility of dismissal to the 
earlier pleading stage before discovery. The Court has amended on its own motion the 
notice pleading rule by now requiring a plaintiff to “state a claim to relief that is plausible 
on its face.”45 A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.46 Deciding whether a claim is “plausible,” the Court said, involves “a 
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 
common sense.”47 If nothing else, by moving the risk of dismissal earlier in the case, the 
Court has reduced the settlement value of the claims from what that value would be at the 
summary judgment stage, thereby making it more difficult for workers to bring their cases 
in the first instance and to have their rights vindicated.48 
                                                                                                                                                     
43 See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, Summary Judgment Rates Over Time, Across Case 
Categories, and Across Districts: An Empirical Study of Three Large Federal Districts 3 (2008), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138373 (explaining that after standards for summary judgment were made easier by 
the Supreme Court in 1986, the rate of summary judgments in employment discrimination cases went up by 
25%). 
44 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
45 Id. at 678. (emphasis added) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). 
46 Id. See also Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. 544 (new plausibility standard for Rule 12(b)(6) established in a 
consumer antitrust case). 
47 Id. at 679. Given the skepticism of the federal judiciary about the continuing existence of discrimination, 
while plausible to many, may not be plausible to many federal judges. 
48 Yasutora Watanabe, Learning and Bargaining in Dispute Resolution: Theory and Evidence from Medical 
Malpractice Litigation 3 (Univ. of Penn., Job Market Paper, 2004) (“As new information is revealed during 
bargaining, learning takes place and the negotiating parties update their expectations of obtaining a favorable 
verdict. I allow the rate of arrival of information to differ in the pre-litigation and the litigation phases, for 
example because of the ‘discovery process’ which follows the filing of a lawsuit. Learning has the effect of 
drawing the plaintiff and defendant’s expectations of the trial results closer to each other, which in turn 
increases the probability of agreement.”). 
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A key question of fact in most statutory claims of discrimination is whether or not 
the employer acted with intent to discriminate. Whether or not this intent element actually 
involves a question of the employer’s state of mind, the evidence for why the employer 
acted is for the employer to know. While the employer may announce a reason, discovery is 
useful and typically necessary to probe for explanations other than that “official” reason. 
Thus, dismissing a discrimination case before discovery can foreclose the right of 
employees who have been discriminated against to have any real chance to prove it. Iqbal is 
not merely a theoretical threat to the antidiscrimination project. In fact, preliminary 
evidence shows that plaintiffs’ cases have been increasingly dismissed at the pleading stage. 
Iqbal [has] negatively affected plaintiffs in at least 15% to 21% of cases that faced 
Rule 12(b)(6) motions in the post-Iqbal data window. [D]epending on the nature of 
the suit, these figures represent between one-fourth and two-fifths of the cases that 
fail to reach discovery on at least some claims in the post-Iqbal data window.49 
 
If a claim manages to survive a motion to dismiss, then the next issue is whether or 
not the claim satisfies the prerequisites for Rule 23 class actions.50 Class actions can be an 
effective way to challenge employment discrimination since many are of low economic 
value, making individual claim litigation prohibitively expensive. Class actions are a way to 
aggregate these individual claims so that the underlying claims are resolved and not just 
                                                 
49 Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on 
Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270 (2012). No doubt a good number of the dismissed cases were not 
likely to advance to trial after discovery because they would be disposed of at the summary judgment stage. 
But, presumably, some of these would prove to be good plaintiffs’ cases if they had been allowed to advance 
to discovery and trial. 
50 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
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dropped for reasons unconnected with their merits.51 The Supreme Court, however, has 
made bringing class actions claiming discrimination much more difficult because of its 
decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.52 In Wal-Mart, the Court narrowed the 
availability of class actions by its interpretation of both Rule 23(a)(2) and 23(b)(2) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.53 Rule 23(a)(2) requires a party seeking class certification 
to prove that there are “questions of law or fact common to the class.”54 To satisfy Rule 
23(a)(2), the lawsuit must resolve an issue that all the class members share. In Wal-Mart, 
the issue underlying the claims of all members of the class was whether Wal-Mart’s policy 
of granting each store manager unstructured and unreviewed discretion to make pay and 
promotion decisions created a substantial risk of discrimination for all the women working 
in all the stores.55 Without directly addressing that issue, the Court held that there was no 
common question of “law or fact.”56 As a result, the class could not be certified because it 
could not meet the requirements of Rule 23(a). Essentially, the Court claimed to rely on 
                                                 
51 It is especially true that workers at the bottom of the compensation scale are disproportionally impacted by 
the cutting of class actions. It is also true that women and people of color are likely to be near the bottom of 
the wage scale. 
52 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (holding that a nationwide class action by women employees at Wal-Mart stores is 
not certifiable as a class action). 
53 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
54 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
55 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547. Where a policy of discrimination is alleged, the plaintiff need not show that 
she was actually adversely affected. See Ne. Fla Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. 
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993) (holding that contractors who could not show that they would have won 
contracts if the defendant had relied on an affirmative action plan nevertheless can challenge the plan because 
of their risk of being discriminated against). 
56 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554–58. 
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precedent,57 General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon.58 Falcon had rejected lower 
court authority that if there was a common question of law or fact as to one claim, then the 
class could be expanded to attack defendant’s discrimination “across the board” even if the 
other claims were completely different.59 Falcon involved the quite different claims of 
discrimination in hiring and in promotions, and so the Court found that they shared no 
common issues. In Wal-Mart plaintiffs challenged pay and promotion decisions, but those 
decisions were closely linked since promotions strongly influenced pay and each store 
manager made both decisions.60 Falcon was not on point so in effect the Court created new 
law significantly limiting class action certification where one claim is brought that could 
satisfy the common question requirement.61 Since the opinion by Justice Scalia is rather 
opaque as to its application to the case itself because he does not address the underlying 
claim, the extent of its impact is as of yet unclear. But, in light of Wal-Mart, the Ninth 
Circuit has already denied certification of a class in a case similar to Wal-Mart.62 
                                                 
57 Id. at 2550. 
58 457 U.S. 147 (1982) (holding that a class action for hiring discrimination cannot extend to promotion 
discrimination). 
59 Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw., 457 U.S. 147. 
60 Wal-Mart is an example of an instance where a class action would work because plaintiffs were all low 
wage workers whose individual claims probably were too expensive to litigate individually. 
61 See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes: Lessons for the Legal Quest for Equal Pay, 
46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 229 (2012); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions: 
Wal-Mart v. Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Concepción, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 73 (2011); Scott 
A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan, The Second-Class Class Action: How Courts Thwart Wage Rights By Misapplying 
Class Action Rules, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 523 (2012); Daniel D. DeVougas, Note, Without a Leg to Stand On? 
Class Representatives, Federal Courts, and Standing Desiderata, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 627 (2012). 
62 See Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 975 (2011). 
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While the Rule 23(a) holding decided the case, the Supreme Court went ahead and 
held that plaintiffs’ “claims for backpay were improperly certified under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) . . . where (as here) the monetary relief is not incidental to the 
injunctive or declaratory relief.”63 Any claims for backpay brought under Rule 23(b)(3) 
would be more onerous for the class representative since in 23(b)(3), but not 23(b)(2), class 
members must be given notice and the opportunity to opt out before the case can proceed.64 
The combination of reading common questions of law or fact very narrowly and then 
requiring that all members of the putative class be given notice and the opportunity to opt 
out of the action will minimize the possibility of bringing class actions involving 
employment unless the class is small in number and narrow in scope.65 
Allowing employers to cut off class actions in arbitration agreements and cutting off 
class actions in those disputes that are allowed in court leaves the claims of individual 
workers to the challenges imposed by Iqbal. That heightens the already substantial barriers 
                                                 
63 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557. 
64 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3), 23(b)(2). 
65 Since the public enforcement of Title VII by the Equal Employment Opportunity Committee (EEOC) does 
not depend on Rule 23 class actions, Wal-Mart adds importance to the present systemic enforcement policy of 
the EEOC. 
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that litigation imposes on individual workers.66 Many claims that may well be good ones on 
the merits but have only the potential of a small recovery will never be brought because the 
expense of litigation makes them prohibitive.67 While plaintiffs can reduce their costs of 
litigation by bringing their individual claims pro se, the success rate of pro se cases is very 
poor, especially given the complexity of the law and the lack of sophistication of all but the 
rarest of claimants.68 Thus, this fundamental failure of our litigation system to provide legal 
                                                 
66 See, e.g., Ellen Berrey, Steve G. Hoffman, & Laura Beth Nielsen, Situated Justice: A Contextual Analysis 
of Fairness and Inequality in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1 (2012). The 
piece illuminates the way in which neutral legal rules and cultural frameworks based on the assumption that 
the parties are equally-endowed obscures the structural disadvantages plaintiffs face. Moreover, whatever 
burdens employers have in litigation are considered simply a cost of doing business while employees shoulder 
these burdens in ways that are expensive but also emotionally crushing. The study is based on 100 in-depth 
interviews with defendant’s representatives, plaintiffs, and lawyers based on 1788 cases filed between 1988–
2003. 
67 This is true even though a prevailing party can recover attorney fees in discrimination cases. See, e.g., Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2006). 
68 Of course, many pro se cases may be without merit. There no doubt are, however, cases that would be 
successful if the plaintiff was represented by counsel but that have virtually no chance of success when 
attempted to be litigated by someone without legal expertise. See, e.g., Alan Feuer, Lawyering by Laymen: 
More Litigants Are Taking a Do-It-Yourself Tack, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2001, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/22/nyregion/lawyering-by-laymen-more-litigants-are-taking-a-do-it-
yourself-tack.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
Most courts in the city and across the country do not keep statistics on pro se litigation, though court 
watchers say there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that they are on an upswing. The increase has been 
attributed to the abundance of court programs on television and to the popularity of the do-it-yourself 
movement as a whole. But the most prevalent reason still is not being able to afford hundreds to 
thousands of dollars in lawyers’ fees. 
Id. See also Jonathan D. Rosenbloom, Exploring Methods to Improve Management and Fairness in Pro Se 
Cases: A Study of the Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of New York, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J., 305, 305–
06, (2002). 
Lost in the world of legal procedure and substantive case law, the pro se litigant often finds herself 
confused and overwhelmed, if not frustrated and bitter. Throughout their litigation, pro se litigants are 
confronted with numerous difficulties including complying with procedural rules, understanding 
substantive legal concepts, articulating relevant factual allegations, and simply knowing how to 
proceed with their action. Despite the liberal reading granted to pro se litigant pleadings, pro se 
litigants are almost unanimously ill equipped to encounter the complexities of the judicial system. 
Id. 
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services to low-income and middle-income claimants means that these workers most in 
need of protection and most likely to be victims of discrimination are denied a chance to 
have their cases decided on the merits in federal court.69 
These procedural maneuvers by the Supreme Court do not absolutely prevent 
discrimination cases from being fairly decided, but their net result is to narrow dramatically 
the ability of the victims of employment discrimination to have their day in court.70 The 
following section looks at decisions about substantive antidiscrimination law that have also 
narrowed that law to the disadvantage of the historic victims of discrimination. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
69 One consequence of diminishing federal protections for workers is that workers are left to their remedies 
under state laws. While many states provide protections against discrimination that are broader and more 
amenable to enforcement than federal laws, some states have failed to provide any greater protection than is 
now available in federal court. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 295 (3rd ed. 2005). This 
consequence of our federal system therefore seems to mean that there can be considerable differences in 
protection depending on where workers live and work. In other words, there is unequal protection of laws that 
are supposed to provide equal treatment. 
70 Forcing discrimination claims into arbitration does deny the worker her day in court, her right to a jury 
trial, and her right to initiate a class action where appropriate. It is, as of yet, not clear whether “mandatory” 
arbitration gives the worker as good a chance or a worse chance of winning. See Paul B. Marrow, Determining 
if Mandatory Arbitration is “Fair”: Asymmetrically Held Information and the Role of Mandatory Arbitration 
in Modulating Uninsurable Contract Risks, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rev. 187, 227 (2009–2010) (comparing 125 
litigated cases with 186 securities industry arbitration cases showed that, “while the win rates in arbitration 
exceed those realized in the courthouse, the amounts (on average) awarded by arbitrators were significantly 
lower than the amounts awarded in court.”). See also Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer 
Advantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 400–01 
(2000) (“[T]he use of mandatory arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism for employment discrimination 
claims has failed to give employers an overall advantage.”). 
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II. THE SUBSTANTIVE MOVE TOWARD ENDING THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION PROJECT 
 
Two contesting visions of equal protection have battled since the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.71 Given differing contexts, neither the formalist anticlassification72 
nor the antisubordination view73 of the purpose of the equal protection clause has triumphed 
completely, at least up until the Roberts Court. For example, the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts looked to both purposes depending on the circumstances.74 But the Roberts Court is 
moving ever closer to limiting equal protection to an anticlassification purpose. The Court 
appears to be only one vote away from completely jettisoning the antisubordination purpose 
for the antidiscrimination project.75 This section will briefly trace the two decisions—
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 176 and Ricci v. 
                                                 
71 For an overview of the history of that debate, see Michael J. Zimmer, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Taking the 
Protection Out of Protected Classes, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 409 (2012). For the purposes of this Article, 
equal protection and disparate treatment discrimination jurisprudence are now, if not identical, substantially 
the same. See, e.g., Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2010). 
72 The anticlassification view sees the goal of equal protection, and thereby antidiscrimination law, as 
prohibiting formal classifications based on race, sex, etc. It is typified by a “color-blind” standard for viewing 
claims of race or sex discrimination without looking to the context or impact of the use of that standard. See 
Zimmer, supra note 71, at 416. 
73 The antisubordination view looks to the impact of law on the historic victims of discrimination. Under this 
view, a color-blind standard may generally be appropriate but, in different contexts, that approach is 
counterproductive. See David S. Schwartz, The Case of the Vanishing Protected Class: Reflections on Reverse 
Discrimination, Affirmative Action, and Racial Balancing, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 657, 665 (2000) for a distinction 
between what discrimination means using protected class theory: “Discrimination is not differential treatment 
per se, but differential treatment that arises from, and perpetuates, a caste system, a history of oppression, or 
exclusion of groups based on their group characteristics.”  
74 See Zimmer, supra note 71, at 426–28. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 107 (1976), is credited with articulating the two quite different ways of looking at equal protection 
and antidiscrimination laws. For another classic article from that same era, see Alan Freeman, Legitimizing 
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 
MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978). 
75 Zimmer, supra note 71, at 429–30. 
76 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
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DeStefano77—that show how close the Court has come to strictly limiting the purpose of 
both constitutional and statutory antidiscrimination law to the anticlassification purpose 
epitomized by its formal color-blind standard.  
Parents Involved revisited the issue of race in elementary and secondary schools, but 
it did not involve de jure segregation. Instead, the question involved the use of race by 
school boards to forestall the de facto resegregation of their schools. Both of the school 
districts involved in the case had adopted a modified “student choice” policy for assigning 
pupils to their schools. The first step started with the parents picking the schools their 
children would attend unless that led to particular schools becoming overcrowded. In the 
second step, pupils with siblings already in the school were chosen over others. Third, if 
that did not solve the risk of overcrowding of a particular school, the school board would 
use the race of the individual students to make school assignment to avoid resegregation of 
any of the schools.78 Very few assignments got to this final step, but white parents 
nevertheless challenged this final step in the assignment policy.79 Writing for the Court in 
the first three parts of the opinion, Chief Justice Roberts found that this use of race violated 
equal protection since avoiding the resegregation of the schools was not a compelling 
                                                 
77 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
78 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 711–12. 
79 Id. at 710–11. 
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governmental interest.80 Claiming the mantle of Brown v. Board of Education, the Chief 
Justice concluded his opinion with dramatic flourish, claiming that a color-blind standard 
was justified by Brown. “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race.”81 That final part of the Chief Justice’s opinion was not 
the opinion of the Court since it was not joined by Justice Kennedy, who had joined the first 
three parts to make a majority. Based on the Chief Justice’s broad statement, it appears that 
a plurality of four of the present sitting justices—the Chief Justice along with Justices 
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—have adopted the formalist, anticlassification view of the 
purpose of antidiscrimination law with its color-blind standard for what equal protection 
requires. 
Because of the 4–4 split, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion became the opinion 
of the Court for the purpose of determining the current equal protection test for evaluating 
the express use of race. In it, he stopped just short of joining his four conservative 
colleagues adoption of an absolute color-blind standard. Referring to the Chief Justice’s  
final statement, Justice Kennedy explained why he could not join the final part of the 
plurality opinion: 
                                                 
80 The school district used race if “the racial balance at [any] school falls within a predetermined range based 
on the racial composition of the school district as a whole.” Id. at 710. This attempt at avoiding resegregation 
was found not to be justified by a compelling governmental interest. Id. at 725–26 (while “Seattle contends 
that its use of race helps to reduce racial concentration in schools . . . the plans are directed only to racial 
balance, pure and simple, an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate.”).  
81 Id. at 748. 
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[P]arts of the opinion by The Chief Justice imply an all-too-unyielding insistence 
that race cannot be a factor in instances when, in my view, it may be taken into 
account. The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate interest 
government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of their 
race.82 
 
While school boards violate equal protection if they use the race of individual students 
when assigning them to schools, they are not prohibited from using race in their planning 
processes to establish their pupil placement policies before any student is assigned to a 
school. For planning purposes, school boards may use the projected racial composition of 
its school attendance zones to avoid resegregation.83 
Justice Kennedy’s position draws a distinction between assigning individual pupils 
to schools and setting up attendance zones based on his continuing acceptance of the 
antisubordination purpose for equal protection. His statement echoes the first Justice 
Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, which famously declared that “[o]ur Constitution is 
color-blind.”84 As it was for Justice Harlan, Justice Kennedy rejects a color-blind standard 
of liability. Instead, achieving a color-blind Constitution is an “aspiration” that would be 
                                                 
82 Id. at 787–88 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (providing equal opportunity to all students allows the schools to 
use race to avoid the resegregation of the schools).  
The plurality’s postulate that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race,” is not sufficient to decide these cases. Fifty years of experience 
since Brown v. Board of Education should teach us that the problem before us defies so easy a 
solution. School districts can seek to reach Brown’s objective of equal educational opportunity. The 
plurality opinion is at least open to the interpretation that the Constitution requires school districts to 
ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling. I cannot endorse that conclusion. To the 
extent the plurality opinion suggests the Constitution mandates that state and local school authorities 
must accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken. 
Id. at 788 (citations omitted). 
83 Id. at 788–89. 
84 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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justified once our society would, in fact, be blind to race. To reach that objective, a color-
blind standard “in the real world . . . cannot be a universal constitutional principle.”85 To 
move toward the goal of a color-blind society, school boards can use race to plan to avoid 
the resegregation of the schools and move society a step closer to becoming color-blind in 
reality.86 What does violate equal protection, however, is a school using the race of 
individual students to assign them to their schools. Such individualizing of race is a “crude” 
measure that threatens “to reduce children to racial chits valued [to be] traded according to 
one school’s supply and another’s demand.”87 
After Parents Involved, the Roberts Court was only Justice Kennedy’s vote away 
from adopting the formalist, color-blind standard for equal protection. Even in Parents 
Involved, the difference between the four Justices who would go the whole way and Justice 
Kennedy did not seem that large. Subsequently, Justice Kennedy appeared to move even 
closer to a color-blind standard of equal protection except again in quite narrow 
                                                 
85 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788. 
86 Id. at 788–89: 
If school authorities are concerned that the student-body compositions of certain schools interfere 
with the objective of offering an equal educational opportunity to all of their students, they are free to 
devise race-conscious measures to address the problem in a general way and without treating each 
student in different fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race. School 
boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and races[.] 
Id. Race can be used in the “strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general 
recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting 
students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race.” 
Id. 
87 Id. at 798. In contrast, using race in the district’s planning process is not such a crude measure. “These 
mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to different treatment based on a classification that tells each 
student he or she is to be defined by race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny to be 
found permissible.” Id. at 789. 
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circumstances. In 2009, the Court decided the New Haven firefighters’ case, Ricci v. 
DeStefano,88 which involved a Title VII claim of disparate treatment discrimination when 
the City of New Haven (“City”) decided not to use the results of a civil service promotion 
test. The reason to jettison the test results was that, if used, the result would be a disparate 
impact on test takers who were people of color. Plaintiffs were seventeen whites and one 
Hispanic who, it turned out after the individual test scores had been discarded, would have 
been promoted if the scores were used.89 This time Justice Kennedy spoke for the Court. 
The Court reversed summary judgment that had been granted for the City and decided that, 
as a matter of law, the City had committed disparate treatment discrimination by deciding 
not to use the test scores.90 When the City made its decision, it knew the aggregate racial 
consequences91 of using the test scores and knew that their use would result in an adverse 
effect on the minority test takers, but it did not know the identity of the individual test 
takers.92 Based on the fact that the City knew what the consequences for the three racial 
                                                 
88 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
89 Id. at 574.  
90 Id. at 592–93. 
91 The City did not know the scores of the individual test takers when it was making its decision. Nor did the 
test takers know their scores when the City made its decision. Id. at 567. 
92 The Court summarized the results of the tests as follows: 
Seventy-seven candidates completed the lieutenant examination–43 whites, 19 blacks, and 15 
Hispanics. Of those, 34 candidates passed–25 whites, 6 blacks, and 3 Hispanics. Eight lieutenant 
positions were vacant at the time of the examination. As the rule of three operated, this meant that the 
top 10 candidates were eligible for an immediate promotion to lieutenant. All 10 were white. 
Subsequent vacancies would have allowed at least 3 black candidates to be considered for promotion 
to lieutenant. Forty-one candidates completed the captain examination–25 whites, 8 blacks, and 8 
Hispanics. Of those, 22 candidates passed–16 whites, 3 blacks, and 3 Hispanics. Seven captain 
positions were vacant at the time of the examination. Under the rule of three, 9 candidates were 
eligible for an immediate promotion to captain–7 whites and 2 Hispanics. 
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groups would be, Justice Kennedy took the step of finding the City liable of disparate 
treatment discrimination by deciding not to use the test results.93 That decision, he found, 
was solely the result of the City’s intent to discriminate only against the white firefighters 
who would have been promoted if the test results had been used. That means that the City 
did not intend to discriminate against the Hispanic and African-American test takers who 
were equally disadvantaged when the test scores were not used: “[a]ll the evidence 
demonstrates that the City chose not to certify the examination results because of the 
statistical disparity based on race—i.e., how minority candidates had performed when 
compared to white candidates.”94 Further, Justice Kennedy concluded, “[w]hatever the 
City’s ultimate aim—however well intentioned or benevolent it might have seemed—the 
City made its employment decision because of race. The City rejected the test results solely 
because the higher scoring candidates were white.”95  
                                                                                                                                                     
Id. at 566 (citations omitted). The Court held that as a matter of law the tests resulted in a disparate impact by 
looking just at the pass rates, which did not tell the whole story of that impact since simply passing the test 
would not necessarily lead to promotion during the two year life span for using the tests: 
The racial adverse impact here was significant, and petitioners do not dispute that the City was faced 
with a prima facie case of disparate-impact liability. On the captain exam, the pass rate for white 
candidates was 64 percent but was 37.5 percent for both black and Hispanic candidates. On the 
lieutenant exam, the pass rate for white candidates was 58.1 percent; for black candidates, 31.6 
percent; and for Hispanic candidates, 20 percent. The pass rates of minorities . . . . were 
approximately one-half the pass rates for white candidates[.] 
Id. at 586. 
93 See id. at 592–93. 
94 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 579. 
95 Id. at 579–80 (emphasis added). 
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This moves Justice Kennedy ever closer to his four “conservative” colleagues.96 In 
Parents Involved, the school district went too far in its use of race by knowing and using the 
race of individual students in making school assignments. In Ricci, Justice Kennedy’s 
holding is extraordinary. He found the City solely liable to some white test takers when the 
evidence actually showed that some Hispanic and African-American firefighters were 
disadvantaged by the decision and some members of all three groups with low test scores 
would get another chance by whatever promotion policy the City would use instead.97 
Deciding as a matter of law that the discrimination was only against some white test takers 
when members of all three racial groups were affected by the decision with no evidence that 
out of all the successful test takers the City picked just the white test takers to discriminate 
against is remarkable. Without some nonracial explanation that is not apparent and is very 
unlikely, it is a graphic demonstration that whites are now the group in a preferred position 
                                                 
96 “Conservative” here is used in the sense of alignment with the politics on the right, which, at this time, is 
decidedly activist.  
It is often assumed that liberals like judicial activism and conservatives like judicial restraint. It is not 
so simple. For one thing, judicial activism and judicial restraint do not necessarily correlate with 
liberal and conservative outcomes. For example, on such questions as the constitutionality of 
affirmative action, regulations of commercial advertising, gun control laws, and campaign finance 
regulation, judicial restraint would lead to politically “liberal” results, and judicial activism would 
produce politically “conservative” results. Not surprisingly then, at some times in our history, judicial 
activism has been embraced by conservatives and criticized by liberals, and at other times, judicial 
activism has been embraced by liberals and criticized by conservatives.  
Geoffrey R. Stone, Citizens United and Conservative Judicial Activism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 485, 490 (2012). 
97 Finding liability for disparate treatment discrimination on the simple fact that the City knew what the racial 
consequences of its decision would be in the aggregate is unprecedented. See Michael J. Zimmer, Ricci’s 
“Color-Blind” Standard in a Race Conscious Society: A Case of Unintended Consequences?, 2010 BYU L. 
REV. 1257 (2010). 
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for equal protection.98 At most, the evidence in the record showed that the decision not to 
use the test scores had a disparate impact on the group of white test takers. Since 
Washington v. Davis,99 a showing of disparate impact by itself would not establish an equal 
protection violation if the plaintiffs were people of color and would not prove intentional 
discrimination.100 But now, at least when the plaintiffs are white males, such a showing will 
establish a violation. 
Justice Kennedy claims, nevertheless, that there remains a place for the use of race 
that does not violate equal protection and so, as of now, a small area exists justified by the 
antisubordination principle that he articulated in Parents Involved. An employer still can 
use the potential racial consequences of its actions when it is planning what employment 
practices to adopt but not when they are implemented: 
[We do not] question an employer’s affirmative efforts to ensure that all groups have 
a fair opportunity to apply for promotions and to participate in the process by which 
promotions will be made. But once that process has been established and employers 
have made their selection criteria, they may not then invalidate the test results, thus 
upsetting an employee’s legitimate expectation not to be judged on the basis of race 
. . . Title VII does not prohibit an employer from considering, before administering a 
test or practice, how to design that test or practice in order to provide a fair 
opportunity for all individuals, regardless of their race.101 
                                                 
98 The opinion for the Court by Justice Kennedy and the concurrence by Justice Alito demonstrate great 
empathy for the white plaintiffs. Justice Kennedy’s opinion does not mention the Hispanic plaintiff or the 
other Hispanic and African-American test takers who were disadvantaged when the test results were not used. 
This appears to be a vivid example that we are far from being a post-racial society and, perhaps, is a graphic 
example of how implicit bias influences behavior. 
99 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
100 See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
101 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 585. 
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Justice Kennedy’s approach in Parents Involved and Ricci appear to create a line between 
the permissible and the impermissible use of race, but it is not identical in the two cases. 
Using the race of individual students as the deciding factor in what school a student would 
attend in Parents Involved fell on the impermissible side of the line. But in Ricci, acting on 
the knowledge of the aggregate racial consequences without using the race of the individual 
test takers also fell on the impermissible side of the line. So, a choice to insulate the 
decision-maker from knowing the race of the affected individuals would not necessarily be 
safe from liability since that did not save the City in Ricci. Using race to draw school 
attendance lines is on the permissible side of the line and so too would be its use when 
planning to adopt a particular employment policy, but it falls over the line into the 
impermissible once the employer begins to implement its policy. The line in Ricci has the 
odd consequence of allowing an employer to use the projected racial consequences of an 
employment practice but denying it the right to use race once the policy is in use and the 
actual racial consequences become known. 
How strong at least one Justice’s view of the color-blind standard is can be seen by 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Ricci. While speaking only for himself, he suggests that the 
disparate impact provisions of Title VII violate equal protection because they require that 
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the employer like the City in Ricci know the racial consequences of the employment 
practice it uses.102 That knowledge violates an absolute color-blind rule of equal protection: 
Title VII not only permits but affirmatively requires [employer] actions 
when a disparate-impact violation would otherwise result . . . . Title 
VII’s disparate-impact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales, 
often requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their 
policies, and to make decisions based on (because of) those racial 
outcomes. That type of racial decisionmaking is, as the Court explains, 
discriminatory.103 
 
For Justice Scalia, the anticlassification underpinnings of his color-blind rule of equal 
protection completely trump the antisubordination basis for disparate impact law. Since the 
constitution trumps statutes, the disparate impact provisions in section 703(k) of Title VII 
appear to be unconstitutional by his lights, at least as to claims of race discrimination.104 
“Requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and to make 
decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes” would result in section 703(k)’s 
unconstitutionality.105 In other words, what the Rehnquist Court failed to effectuate by its 
                                                 
102 Id. at 595 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia does not announce his support for that conclusion, but he 
certainly is encouraging parties to raise the issue. 
103 Id. at 594. He further elaborates: 
To be sure, the disparate-impact laws do not mandate imposition of quotas, but it is not clear why that 
should provide a safe harbor. Would a private employer not be guilty of unlawful discrimination if he 
refrained from establishing a racial hiring quota but intentionally designed his hiring practices to 
achieve the same end? Surely he would. Intentional discrimination is still occurring, just one step up 
the chain. Government compulsion of such design would therefore seemingly violate equal protection 
principles. Nor would it matter that Title VII requires consideration of race on a wholesale, rather 
than retail, level. 
Id. at 594–95. 
104 It is not clear what would happen to claims of disparate impact discrimination based on sex, national 
origin, religion, age, or disability. 
105 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594. 
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statutory interpretation of Title VII in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,106 when Congress 
rejected that view by enacting section 703(k) in the 1991 Civil Rights Act,107 Justice Scalia 
suggests be done by basing its view in the Constitution. 
The 2011 decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes will have a significant impact 
on class action, but it may also implicate substantive antidiscrimination law. While dealing 
with the class action issues, the Court described both Title VII theories of systemic 
disparate treatment and systemic disparate impact. Those descriptions may foreshadow the 
future thrust of the Court’s interpretation of those laws.108 As to systemic disparate 
treatment, Justice Scalia never analyzed the basic statistical showing the plaintiffs had made 
that there was a substantial difference in pay and promotions for women and men across all 
the Wal-Mart stores.109 Such a showing has long been the start of a systemic disparate 
treatment case showing a policy or practice of discrimination.110 Without referring to the 
evidence in the record, Justice Scalia found there was no “‘significant proof’ that Wal-Mart 
operated under a general policy of discrimination.”111 While Wal-Mart was not shown to 
not have an express policy of discrimination, the policy of granting unstructured and 
                                                 
106 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
107 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
108 Zimmer, supra note 97. 
109 Uncontroverted evidence showed that women were paid less than men across the country and that they 
filled 70% of the hourly jobs but only 33% of management jobs, even though most promotions come from the 
pool of hourly workers. While the opinion of the Court did not mention these statistics, Justice Ginsburg did 
quote the district court’s finding of facts. Wal-Mart,131 S.Ct. 2541, 2563 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
110 See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (because African American truck drivers who 
worked for the employer were available, the “inexorable zero” of them in the line driver job was systemic 
disparate treatment discrimination). 
111 131 S. Ct. at 2553–54. 
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unreviewed discretion to the store managers to make pay and promotion decisions, while 
neutral on its face, had significant impact on women because of the way those managers 
exercised that discretion. All the Wal-Mart women faced the risk of discrimination. That 
was the central issue in the case, and the Supreme Court failed to deal with it.  
Plaintiffs further relied on the techniques for sophisticated statistical analysis that 
the Court had approved in Hazelwood School District112 and Bazemore v. Friday.113 Justice 
Scalia finds that this evidence is not probative of discrimination because the studies were 
“insufficient to establish that [plaintiffs’] theory can be proved on a classwide basis.”114 “A 
regional pay disparity, for example, may be attributable to only a small set of Wal-Mart 
stores, and cannot by itself establish the uniform, store-by-store disparity upon which the 
plaintiffs’ theory of commonality depends.”115 Rather than following precedent by first 
analyzing the basic statistical data and the statistical studies flowing from that data, Justice 
Scalia begins his discussion by criticizing “social frameworks” evidence for not 
demonstrating statistical significance, even though that type of evidence is not statistically 
based.116 The failure to even acknowledge what the precedents were and how they were 
                                                 
112 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). 
113 438 U.S. 385 (1986). 
114 131 S. Ct. at 2555. To support his conclusion, he fails to look at the challenged policy from the 
perspective of Wal-Mart itself and looks only at whether or not the policy was uniformly discriminatory in 
operation.  
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
Is the Antidiscrimination Project Being Ended? 
2013 
30 
 
applied does not bode well for the future of the systemic disparate treatment theory of 
discrimination.  
Without saying so, the Court may be moving toward the view of Judge Ikuta from 
her dissent in Dukes in the Ninth Circuit.117 She would narrow systemic disparate treatment 
claims to express policies of discrimination and to policies neutral on their face but shown 
to have been adopted by the members of top management with an intent to discriminate. By 
her view, Teamsters, Hazelwood School District, and Bazemore,118 and their statistically 
based proof of systemic disparate treatment by the corporate employer would be jettisoned. 
The Court did not go that far, but Wal-Mart is a step in that direction. 
The discussion of systemic disparate impact law is equally disturbing and 
inadequate. While acknowledging that delegating discretion to make pay and promotion 
decisions to the store managers was the kind of “subjective” employment practice that the 
Court had held in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust could be challenged as disparate 
impact discrimination,119 Justice Scalia characterizes Wal-Mart’s subjective policy as “a 
very common and presumptively reasonable way of doing business—one that that we have 
said ‘should itself raise no inference of discriminatory conduct.’”120 Other than his own 
view of what is reasonable and not discriminatory, and in face of evidence clearly showing 
                                                 
117 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 603 F.3d 571, 637 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
118 See Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
395, 410 (2011) (“Justice Scalia . . . frames systemic disparate treatment theory as imposing entity liability 
only for individual moments of disparate treatment”). 
119 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
120 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554. 
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impact on women, Justice Scalia’s approach, if adopted, would suggest that plaintiffs 
cannot use statistical evidence to challenge the way a policy operates. If so, that would 
appear to preclude the application of section 703(k)’s ban on disparate impact 
discrimination at least to subjective practices and perhaps to employer practices whether 
they were objective or subjective.121 
In sum, the Court in Parents Involved held that the defendants violated equal 
protection because the final step of their pupil assignment policy used the race of individual 
students to avoid resegregation.122 In Ricci, the defendants took action to avoid the risk of 
disparate impact liability but that action violated Title VII’s disparate treatment basis for 
liability because it had a disparate impact on whites. This is so even though there was no 
evidence of an intent to discriminate against the whites and the decision had a negative 
impact on some members of all three races. White plaintiffs won in these two cases. In Wal-
Mart, the Court not only refused to certify a class of women workers but, in doing so, 
appears to have run roughshod over substantive Title VII law. In Parents Involved, four 
Justices rejected any antisubordination purpose for antidiscrimination law and appeared to 
be calling for an absolute color-blind standard for antidiscrimination. The last holdout 
among the conservative Justices is Justice Kennedy and, for him, the antisubordination 
purpose, by which color-blindness is an aspiration, not a standard of liability, applies only 
                                                 
121 Of course, given Justice Scalia’s apparent view that the disparate impact provisions of Title VII in section 
703(k) are unconstitutional, it may be that he thinks careful analysis of a disparate impact case is not 
necessary. 
122 See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text.  
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in limited circumstances. Despite the distinction that he articulates, Justice Kennedy 
ultimately voted with the conservative bloc in all three of these cases and wrote the decision 
in one of them. 
III. THE FUTURE OF THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION PROJECT 
A. Affirmative Action in Higher Education 
The current Term may provide further understanding of the present Court’s 
treatment of the antidiscrimination project. In February, 2012, the Court granted certiorari 
in Fisher v. University of Texas.123 Fisher involves a challenge to an affirmative action 
admissions policy used by the University of Texas at Austin (UT) to admit undergraduates. 
This is the first chance the Roberts Court has had to address issues of affirmative action in 
higher education.124 The Fifth Circuit found the policy not unconstitutional because it was 
                                                 
123 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (Feb. 21, 2012). The oral argument was 
October 10, 2012. Justice Kagan recused herself. There already is some significant academic analysis of 
Fisher, even before it is argued or decided. The first round of a Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc Roundtable 
was published on July 23, 2012 and consists of articles by Vikram David Amar, Is Honesty the Best (Judicial) 
Policy in Affirmative Action Cases? Fisher v. University of Texas Gives the Court (Yet) Another Chance to 
Say Yes, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 77 (2012); James F. Blumstein, Grutter and Fisher: A Reassessment and 
a Preview, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 57 (2012); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Diversity Paradox: Judicial 
Review in an Age of Demographic and Educational Change, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 113 (2012); 
Girardeau A. Spann, Fisher v. Grutter, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 45 (2012); Gerald Torres, Fisher v. 
University of Texas: Living in the Dwindling Shadow of LBJ’s America, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 97 
(2012). 
124 Based on the prior voting record of the present members of the Court, the chances that the lower court 
will be reversed are quite high.  
Chief Justice Roberts and Associate Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito have never voted to 
uphold the affirmative action programs at issue in any racial affirmative action case that the Supreme 
Court has resolved on the merits of a constitutional challenge. Even though Justice Kennedy does not 
always cast his swing vote with the four other conservative Justices on nonracial issues, Justice 
Kennedy has always voted with the conservative bloc to invalidate racial affirmative action. 
Spann, supra note 123, at 48. 
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consistent with the Rehnquist Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger125 that upheld the 
University of Michigan law school’s affirmative action policy. In affirming summary 
judgment for UT, the Fifth Circuit held “that the Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit a 
university's ‘narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling 
interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.’ 
Mapping on Grutter, UT evaluates each application using a holistic, multi-factor approach, 
in which race is but one of many considerations.”126 Fisher argues that the UT’s policy is 
beyond Grutter but also challenges Grutter itself.127 
The challenged policy was only one part of a broader program by the university to 
create a diverse student body. Eighty-one percent of the entering class was admitted through 
the Top Ten Percent Law128 (“Top Ten Percent”) that guarantees admission to all graduates 
of Texas high schools who are in the top ten percent of their class. With ninety percent of 
the undergraduate seats reserved for Texas residents, all but two percent of Texas resident 
applicants are admitted through the Top Ten Percent program.129 Some of the non-Top Ten 
Percent admissions of Texans are made based only on their Academic Index (AI) scores—a 
                                                 
125 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
126 Fisher, 631 F.3d at 218 (quoting Grutter, 529 U.S. at 343). 
127 The question presented is: “Whether the University of Texas at Austin’s use of race in undergraduate 
admissions decisions is lawful under this Court’s decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, including Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).” Brief for Petitioner at i, Fisher 
v. Univ. of Texas, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (No. 11-345). 
128 TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2009). 
129 Fisher, 631 F.3d at 227. 
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formula based on SAT or ACT scores and high school grade point averages.130 Those 
Texans not admitted on their AI scores then still have a chance to be admitted by a 
combination of their AI scores and another score, the Personal Achievement Index (PAI). 
The PAI is made up of scores on two essays and a personal achievement score.131 The PAI 
consists of the holistic evaluation of demonstrated 
leadership qualities, awards and honors, work experience, and involvement in 
extracurricular activities and community service. In addition, the personal 
achievement score includes a “special circumstances” element that may reflect the 
socioeconomic status of the applicant and his or her high school, the applicant's 
family status and family responsibilities, the applicant's standardized test score 
compared to the average of her high school, and . . . the applicant's race.132 
 
 In 2008, the year Fisher applied, only 216 of the 1208 non-Top Ten Percent admittees from 
Texas were African American or Hispanic; many of these students would have been 
admitted without regard to their race on, for example, their AI score alone.133 
Based on its interpretation of Grutter, the Fifth Circuit adopted the lower court’s 
evaluation of the policy: 
The district court found that both the UT and Grutter policies “attempt to promote 
‘cross-racial understanding,’ ‘break down racial stereotypes,’ enable students to 
better understand persons of other races, better prepare students to function in a 
multicultural workforce, cultivate the next set of national leaders, and prevent 
minority students from serving as ‘spokespersons’ for their race.” Like the law 
school in Grutter, UT “has determined, based on its experience and expertise, that a 
‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minorities is necessary to further its compelling 
interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student body.” UT has made 
                                                 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 228. 
132 Id. 
133 Id.at 261. 
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an “educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission,” 
just as Michigan's Law School did in Grutter.134 
 
The main thrust of Fisher’s argument is that, despite the lower courts’ analysis, her 
case is easily distinguished from Grutter.135 In the last five pages of her merits brief, she 
finally argues that “Grutter should be clarified or overruled” because the lower court 
“preserved the form of strict scrutiny but replaced its substance with deference to the 
academy at every stage of the judicial inquiry.”136 Since Fisher quotes Justice Kennedy’s 
dissent in Grutter eight times in those five pages, he is obviously the target of her attack on 
Grutter. He, along with Justices Scalia and Thomas who are now on the Court, were in the 
dissent in Grutter.137 Although Fisher does not cite Parents Involved in this section of her 
brief, she appears to hope to convince Justice Kennedy that Grutter does not survive his 
approach to the use of race in that case.138 
                                                 
134 Id. at 230–31 (footnotes omitted). 
135 In summary, she claims that the UT policy is not consistent with Grutter because UT uses race to mirror 
the demographics of Texas, not to enhance educational diversity. Furthermore, unlike in Grutter, UT measures 
the “critical mass” of students of color at the classroom level, not the student body as a whole. Also, UT did 
not show a “strong basis in evidence” that its use of race was “necessary” because Top Ten Percent 
admissions had already produced a diverse student body. Next, echoing Parents Involved, she argues that the 
use of race is not narrowly tailored because so few students are admitted pursuant to it. Finally, she argues that 
the Fifth Circuit substituted a good-faith, process-oriented review for strict scrutiny. See Brief for Petitioner at 
53–57, Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (No. 11-345). 
136 Id. at 53. 
137 While neither Chief Justice Roberts nor Justice Alito were on the Court when Grutter was decided, Fisher 
is probably safe to assume, based on Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Parents Involved that called for a 
color-blind standard of equal protection, that they will vote to overrule Grutter. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and 
Sotomayor are likely to vote to affirm. 
138 See Amar, supra note 123, at 85 (predicting Justice Kennedy will be the key vote and will either write the 
opinion for the Court or his concurrence will be its actual holding). 
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If the Court reaches the substantive question,139 Justice Kennedy’s present position 
on affirmative action is likely to be the swing vote that determines the outcome.140 In his 
Grutter dissent, Justice Kennedy begins his opinion by adopting Justice Powell’s position in 
Bakke that, based on academic freedom found in the First Amendment, educational 
diversity is a compelling governmental interest:141 
The separate opinion by Justice Powell in Regents of University of California v. 
Bakke is based on the principle that a university admissions program may take 
account of race as one, nonpredominant factor in a system designed to consider each 
applicant as an individual, provided the program can meet the test of strict scrutiny 
by the judiciary.142 
 
While accepting that educational diversity is a compelling governmental interest, 
Justice Kennedy faulted the Grutter majority for failing to do what it said it was doing, 
which was applying strict scrutiny to the law school’s use of race.143 In Justice Kennedy’s 
view, the Court had confused the end (the compelling governmental interest in educational 
diversity) with the means (that race was narrowly tailored to achieve that end).144 Because 
of the deference accorded the law school, the Court failed to adequately review what a 
                                                 
139 There are significant justiciability issues—standing, mootness including whether defendant’s conduct is 
capable of repetition yet evading review—issues that might be decided to pretermit consideration of the 
merits. For a discussion of these issues and a critique of the Court’s failure to decide them consistently, see 
Amar, supra note 123, at 85. 
140 With Justice Kagan having recused herself, the Court would likely be evenly divided if Justice Kennedy 
joins with the moderate bloc to make it 4–4. In that case, the lower court decision is affirmed but the Court’s 
decision is without precedential value. 
141 A way to distinguish Justice Kennedy’s acceptance of the rejection of diversity as a compelling 
governmental interest for lower education in Parents Involved may be that academic freedom is more solidly 
established in higher education. 
142 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
143 Id.  
144 Id. at 387–88. 
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“critical mass” of students of color meant and whether it was narrowly tailored to achieve 
only educational diversity and not racial balancing. For Justice Kennedy, the law school’s 
“concept of critical mass [was] a delusion used by the Law School to mask its attempt to 
make race an automatic factor in most instances and to achieve numerical goals 
indistinguishable from quotas” because “race is likely [to be] outcome determinative for 
many members of minority groups”145 who are not accepted simply on their Law School 
Admissions Test (LSAT) and Undergraduate Average (UGA) scores. Thus, for him, 
achieving that critical mass meant that the determination of admissions decisions for these 
minority applicants was not individualized in a holistic sense but was simply based on their 
race.146 
Based on his approach in Grutter, Justice Kennedy is likely to be as critical of the 
Fifth Circuit’s deference to UT in Fisher as he was of the deference the Court gave to the 
Michigan Law School in Grutter. In fact, the Fifth Circuit appeared to extend its deference 
from determining that educational diversity was a compelling governmental interest, the 
acceptable area of deference for Justice Kennedy, to UT’s determination that the way the 
policy worked satisfied strict scrutiny.147 Thus, the Fifth Circuit found that “the narrow-
tailoring inquiry [that is, whether the means are narrowly tailored to serve only the end]—
like the compelling-interest inquiry—is undertaken with a degree of deference to the 
                                                 
145 Id. at 389. 
146 Id. 
147 Amar, supra note 123, at 86. 
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University’s constitutionally protected, presumably expert academic judgment.”148 This 
appears to be at odds with a point in Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter: “[t]he Court 
confuses deference to a university’s definition of its educational objective with deference to 
the implementation of this goal. . . . [D]eference is not to be given with respect to the 
methods by which [educational diversity] is pursued.”149 
The approach Justice Kennedy took in Grutter appears in a way to foreshadow his 
subsequent approach in Parents Involved, where he joined the opinion of Chief Justice 
Roberts finding that the use of the racial identity of individual children to assign them to 
schools violated equal protection.150 In contrast to Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy 
still did accept the antisubordination purpose for equal protection: 
If school authorities are concerned that the student-body compositions of certain 
schools interfere with the objective of offering an equal educational opportunity to 
all of their students, they are free to devise race-conscious measures to address the 
problem in a general way and without treating each student in different fashion 
solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race. School boards may 
pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and races.151 
 
Thus, it is not a violation of equal protection for a school board to use race in siting schools, 
setting attendance zones, and for other purposes to avoid resegregation.152 But using the 
race of individual students to assign them to their schools goes too far and violates equal 
                                                 
148 Fisher, 631 F.3d. at 232. 
149 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
150 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
151 Id. at 788–89. 
152 Race can be used in the “strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general 
recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting 
students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race.” 
Id. at 789. 
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protection. For Justice Kennedy, the law school in Grutter, though masked by the law 
school’s claim it was acting to achieve educational diversity by admitting a “critical mass” 
of students of color, was just using race to admit applicants to the law school.153 Note that in 
his view in Grutter, the race of individual applicants to law school can be used in making 
admission decisions to law school as long as race is not “predominate.” In Parents Involved, 
the race of a student was determinative of the school she would go to. In a way, his 
accepting of deference to a school board in its role-setting policy by, for example, deciding 
to avoid school resegregation, mirrors his acceptance of deference to the Michigan Law 
School’s determination that educational diversity was a compelling governmental interest 
satisfying the first step of strict scrutiny, but his problem arose once those policies were 
being implemented. 
In Ricci, Justice Kennedy claimed that it was permissible to use the knowledge of 
the racial consequences of a practice the employer was thinking of using. But he found there 
was intentional discrimination solely against the white test takers even though the City did 
not know the race of the individual test takers when it made its decision.154 Knowing the 
general consequences for three different racial groups, whether or not it used the test scores 
for promotion, still triggered liability in favor of some of the white test takers even without 
individualization. So Justice Kennedy appears to now take the position that, at least as to 
white plaintiffs, the line between the permissible and impermissible uses of race is no 
                                                 
153 See supra 144–46 and accompanying text. 
154 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 580 (2009). 
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longer solely when the race of individuals is used, but also when an action is taken when its 
aggregated racial consequences are known but the impact on individuals is not known. 
Whatever Justice Kennedy has said, he has, so far, always come out in favor of white 
plaintiffs. 
After knowing how Justice Kennedy has dealt with race cases brought by whites, it 
is not difficult to predict that UT will likely lose in Fisher. In deferring to UT’s method of 
implementing its plan, the Fifth Circuit failed to dig deeply into what “critical mass” means 
and how it worked. Because of this failure, Justice Kennedy is likely to find that the 
deference the lower court gave to UT masks the use of race as determinative in admissions, 
just as he did in Grutter. So reversal of the Fifth Circuit is very likely but, if the decision is 
reversed, it should be remanded for a full inquiry into the question of what “educational 
diversity” means and, quantitatively and qualitatively, what constitutes the “critical mass” 
that satisfies strict scrutiny. The concept of “critical mass” was not developed by the Court 
in Grutter or by the Fifth Circuit in Fisher, nor was its relationship to “educational 
diversity.” If the description of the plan is simply a cover for making admissions where race 
predominates, the plan will fail to satisfy strict scrutiny. But, if Grutter is still good law, the 
way the plan operates and the way race is used when its use is not predominant will 
determine whether the plan survives strict scrutiny. 
To judge the relationship between the means and the end requires some development 
of what “educational diversity” is all about. The Court has rejected the use of race to 
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achieve racial balance or to redress general “societal discrimination” because they involve 
the direct use of race as an end the Court has found to be unconstitutional.155 “Educational 
diversity,” therefore, has to be an end independent of race itself and apparently independent 
of the positive consequences for those people of color who are admitted through the 
affirmative action plan.156 Thus, “race-based advantages for minorities are justified as 
instrumental—a means to achieve a broader objective . . . [that] does not focus on minority 
students or their interests but on ‘attaining a diverse student body.’”157 Disconnecting equal 
protection from its original purpose of aiding the victims of slavery shows how warped the 
law has become when equal protection is limited to an anticlassfication purpose that 
protects whites much more than it protects the historic victims of discrimination.158 
What people of color add to the white majority’s educational experience—their 
instrumental use—is the significantly different life experience they may have lived before 
they come to college.159 That includes the experience of racism and discrimination. But it 
also includes the differences that result from the extensive segregation of housing and 
                                                 
155 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353. See id. at 330 (“racial balancing . . . is patently unconstitutional”). Race may be 
the end served only when providing a remedy to the actual victims of defendant’s discrimination. 
156 Blumstein, supra note 123, at 65 (“Justification for the preference did not focus on the students receiving 
the preference—redressing class-based harms to minorities disadvantaged by past racial injustices. . . . The 
student who secured the lion’s share of the educational benefits from student body diversity were white 
students who matriculated.”). 
157 Blumstein, supra note 123, at 65. 
158 See Amar, supra note 123, at 95–96 (stating that the original intent of equal protection was to authorize 
governmental action to aid the victims of slavery). 
159 See Brown-Nagin, supra note 123, at 129. 
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schools and the treatment of people of color in society generally.160 The lion’s share of the 
white majority has experienced racial segregation in housing and schools, but they are much 
less likely to focus on it as a racial issue.161 Generally, they look at all, or almost all, white 
neighborhoods and schools to be natural or the normal state of affairs and not the 
consequences of the racial divide in this country.162 Thus, in determining “critical mass,” it 
is necessary to decide how large the presence of people of color must be to educate the 
predominantly white student body of what society actually looks like as a whole. Using the 
percentage of people of color in our society at large could be the “critical mass” one might 
expect because, if achieved, the student body would then mirror society. But, of course, it is 
more complicated than that. For many reasons beyond the scope of this Article, but 
including the result of residential and school segregation and extreme economic inequality 
that has a tremendous negative impact on people of color, a university, particularly a 
                                                 
160 Id. at 130. 
161 Id. (“Whites are the least likely to comfortably interact with those from different racial backgrounds 
because they are the least likely of all college matriculates to have interacted with other racial groups prior to 
arriving on campus. Blacks, Latinos, and Asians all grow up in more integrated areas, and by virtue of their 
racial ‘minority status,’ these groups tend to attain white cultural literacy.”) (citation omitted). See also 
BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT NOW I SEE: WHITE RACE CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE LAW 1 (1997) 
(explaining that whites are largely unconscious as to their race and to the advantages flowing from being 
white). 
162 That the residential segregation is largely the product of de facto discrimination and that school 
segregation flows from residential segregation does not mean that it is not the product of illegal 
discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968), provides for equal 
housing opportunities regardless of race, creed, or national origin. It further provides for government 
enforcement. Id. Still, housing discrimination is difficult to challenge when it involves individual housing 
transactions. 
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“flagship” like UT, might be hard pressed to find that many people of color who would be 
successful students if admitted.163 
Whatever the upper limit is, it is clear that token representation is not the “critical 
mass.”164 For one reason, people of color cast as racial tokens are pushed to be 
“representatives of their race,” rather than individuals with their own interests, values, 
skills, and goals.165 So, tokenism is not diversity. The law school in Grutter looked to 
having a critical mass in the school overall.166 That may be sufficient where, at least in most 
law schools, the first-year classes are required and so people of color in those required 
classes would make them diverse. UT, however, is a huge university, with many schools, 
departments, majors, and areas of study.167 Having the “critical mass” determined at the 
university-wide level does not necessarily mean that there will actually be diversity in the 
classroom, which UT said was its goal.168 It would surely be an equal protection violation to 
set racial quotas for individual classes that are elective. While encouraging and nudging 
                                                 
163 While redressing societal discrimination through affirmative action has been held not to be a compelling 
governmental interest, admitting students to create an educationally diverse environment is not directly 
redressing that long, sad history of discrimination. Perhaps, the fact that these students of color who are 
admitted will have improved chances to succeed in our multiracial society can be characterized as a bonus to 
the end that is achieved but is not the end itself. 
164 See Torres, supra note 123, at 105. 
165 Do a thought experiment: suppose Justice Thomas or Herman Cain was such a token student in a 
university or one of its classes. If he felt compelled to present the views of the vast majority of people of color, 
his own identity, with views quite different from most but nevertheless the same as some people of color, 
would be submerged. So the full richness of our diverse society would be left in the shadow, leaving one 
dimensional stereotypes. 
166 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318. 
167 People of color are far from being equally represented in all these schools with all their different majors. 
See Brown-Nagin, supra note 123, at 129. 
168 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 225 (5th Cir. 2011).  
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might help, it may be impossible to do that on a large scale at an institution of any size or 
complexity. Therefore, determining “critical mass” at the university-wide level may be the 
best proxy that is available for classroom diversity. But to do that, presumably, the size of 
that mass must be quite large, so the presence of more than a token representation in many 
classes is likely. 
A college education should be much more than simply what goes on in classrooms. 
The life of the university beyond the classroom is important to providing students with the 
experience that prepares them to live successfully once they graduate. So, the ongoing 
experience college students have—from dorm life, to athletics, to groups formed by special 
interests whether or not those interests are academic—can all be experiences that should 
help them mature into successful, complete adults. In determining “critical mass,” a 
university may calculate a numerical goal by taking into account the self-segregation by 
students of color that is all too common in college life outside the classroom. That mass 
must be large enough that students of color will not feel the need to self segregate to “seek 
relief from the burdens of ‘one-way’ integration.”169 
Looking at what “educational diversity” actually means helps determine the 
qualitative, as well as quantitative, dimensions required to achieve a “critical mass” of 
people of color on a campus. Using the representation of people of color in society at large 
                                                 
169 Brown-Nagin, supra note 123, at 131. 
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is a good starting place.170 But many factors influence whether that is practical or not. For 
example, the need to choose only applicants who, by their prior records, are predicted to be 
successful students would influence the number chosen.171 Since, however, the goal of 
educational diversity is to serve the student body generally, the percentage of the whole 
student body necessary to achieve that goal is quite substantial. 
In sum, the Court’s decision in Fisher may directly further the move the Roberts 
Court has made away from an antisubordination view of equal protection and toward a strict 
anticlassification view. Most likely, that depends on the position Justice Kennedy takes.172 
If he decides Fisher is within the holding of Grutter, and Grutter is still good law, he could 
vote to affirm Grutter. This would likely produce a 4–4 decision affirming the Fifth Circuit 
but would have no precedential effect. Should he join his four conservative brethren and 
reverse, the question would be on what grounds. The narrowest result for reversal would be 
to distinguish Fisher from Grutter, deciding that Grutter need not be reconsidered. One 
basis for making that distinction is that the challenged plan is not necessary because the Top 
Ten Percent plan already satisfies the educational diversity goal of UT without directly 
                                                 
170 It is not unreasonable for UT to use the Texas population since the affirmative action plan at issue in 
Fisher is utilized only for Texas residents. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 236. 
171 Admitting applicants of color knowing they are not likely to succeed in order to provide educational 
diversity benefitting the white majority would be a clear demonstration that affirmative action is not 
undertaken to benefit the historic victims of discrimination. 
172 Given the surprise outcome in the Affordable Care Case, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566 (2012), where Chief Justice Roberts, not Justice Kennedy, was the swing vote, it must be remembered 
that it is very hard to predict outcomes in advance. 
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using race.173 A slightly broader basis for reversal would be based on the way the Fifth 
Circuit handled the issue of whether the plan was narrowly tailored to be limited to 
achieving educational diversity. The broadest basis would be to reverse because the Court 
has decided to overrule Grutter. 
B. Other Consequences of a Color-Blind Standard of Liability for Race 
 
From the point of view of those committed to continuing the antidiscrimination 
project, the worst case outcome in Fisher would be if the Court decided to reverse, overrule 
Grutter, and adopt a more or less absolute color-blind rule. If that were to happen, 
challenges to race-based affirmative action by governmental entities, other than public 
institutions of higher education, would likely be successful based on Fisher. There would 
obviously be consequences to antidiscrimination statutes as well, with a high potential to be 
quite disruptive across a wide swath of laws dealing with a variety of situations. Justice 
Scalia gave us a foreshadowing in his concurring opinion in Ricci. He suggested that, 
pursuant to a color-blind standard of equal protection liability, section 703(k) of Title VII 
(which creates the disparate impact cause of action) would be unconstitutional as to race 
because it is a government mandate that employers know and act on the racial consequences 
                                                 
173 The Top Ten Percent plan does not expressly use race but it was enacted with the purpose of expanding 
the racial diversity of UT. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224. It was not challenged in Fisher even though it was enacted 
with a racial purpose. 
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of their employment practices.174 Imposing a color-blind interpretation of antidiscrimination 
statutes would put in jeopardy United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,175 where the Court 
found that a carefully constructed affirmative action plan to benefit African Americans did 
not violate Title VII.176 
Interesting questions would arise as to the constitutionality of governmental 
affirmative action plans based on sex, age, and disability because these classifications are 
not subject to strict scrutiny.177 The equal protection standard for classifications based on 
sex is so-called intermediate scrutiny so that “[p]arties who seek to defend gender-based 
government action must demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for that 
action.”178 It is not at all clear how the Court would view an affirmative action plan for 
women, since the Court views the standards of review for race and sex differently.179 The 
Court’s decision in Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, upholding an 
affirmative action plan to benefit women, despite a challenge under Title VII, would be of 
                                                 
174 See supra note 102–107 and accompanying text. Age classifications are subject to rational basis scrutiny. 
Disability classifications are judged using deferential rational basis scrutiny so the disparate impact provisions 
of the Americans with Disability Act, section 12112(b)(3), would likely not be found to violate equal 
protection. As for age discrimination, see Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004), where 
the court held that an employer plan treating the older group of workers better than a younger group, with all 
over age 40, did not violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). 
175 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
176 Id. at 197. 
177 Disability classifications are subject to rational basis review, perhaps with a bite. See City of Cleburne, 
Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), which would make for interesting equal 
protection questions. 
178 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531(1996). 
179 The difference between the constitutional standards for race and gender might reside in cases where the 
Court accepts that there are true genetically-based differences between men and women. See e.g., Nguyen v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Service, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) (women, not men, give birth to babies). 
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questionable continuing authority.180 If the Court established something like a gender-blind 
rule for sex discrimination claims, it would seem to put at risk some earlier decisions where 
gender classifications had been upheld.181 It is also unclear how affirmative action for 
women would be treated.182 
All in all, the adoption of a strict color-blind standard for race-based affirmative 
action would likely have implications far beyond race cases. It would raise issues in broad 
areas of the law and could trigger successful challenges to those laws. The potential for the 
disruption of a wide swath of law might give the Court pause before taking this final step, a 
step that now seems to be up to Justice Kennedy. 
CONCLUSION 
The Roberts Supreme Court has been slicing away at the bolus of the 
antidiscrimination law. It is doing this through the creation of new procedural law, 
including strong presumption favoring arbitration agreements. These include so-called 
“mandatory” agreements as well as ones involving a union waivers of the statutory rights of 
the workers it represents. To the extent arbitration is the forum for resolving employment 
disputes, the workers are not only deprived of the right to go to court but also to a jury and, 
most likely, to bring class actions. For those employment disputes that are not sent to 
arbitration, the Court has rejected notice pleading and imposed a heightened “plausible” 
                                                 
180 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
181 See e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (stating that the exclusion of women from the military 
draft does not violate equal protection). 
182 See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 642 (holding that Title VII does not prohibit affirmative action plan for women). 
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standard for pleading. Also, class actions have become much more limited and difficult to 
pursue for claims of discrimination. 
Substantively, the Court has also been narrowing antidiscrimination law by its 
interpretations of the systemic theories of discrimination—disparate treatment and disparate 
impact.183 Individual disparate treatment discrimination is difficult to prove and, given the 
new procedural limits on litigating these cases, the antidiscrimination project gets ever 
smaller in scope and possibility. For equal protection law, the Court is edging ever closer to 
a final rejection of the antisubordination purpose and the acceptance of the anticlassification 
one. Should the Court take that final step by the changed vote of Justice Kennedy, all of 
antidiscrimination law will be vulnerable to constitutional attack, including the disparate 
impact theory of discrimination. 
Limiting the scope of the antidiscrimination laws to an anticlassification purpose 
imposes an unstated, and unproven, assumption that the present existing social, economic, 
and employment situation eliminates the need for direct attempts to redress the historic 
discrimination that continues unabated today. The antidiscrimination laws have been turned 
upside down. The antidiscrimination project is gradually being ended. 
                                                 
183 See, Zimmer, supra note 71, at 455. 
